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The Dynamics of Unreliable Narration  Implicit and Omitted Authors, Double Narratees and Constructive Readers in First Person Unreliable Narration 
 
When Ansgar Nünning up through the 1990’ies published a series of articles where he repeatedly 
claimed the inadequacy of the existing theories on unreliable narration, he opened for an important 
perspective which hitherto had only received very little if any attention. Nünning claimed that 
unreliable narrators should and could not be understood “as a structural nor as a semantic aspect of 
the textbase alone, but only by taking into account the conceptual frameworks that readers bring for 
the text” (1999 60).  
 Nünning’s attempt was provocative and to some extent exaggerated, but did still make an 
accurate point.1 We can find several examples where the detection of a narrator’s unreliability, or at 
least the extent of it, seems to be governed by some historical delay.2 By redirecting the attention 
away from the text towards the cognitive process of the reader, Nünning questioned nearly all 
former conceptualizations of unreliable narration insofar as these have been constructed upon 
Booth’s initiating definition where a narrator was “reliable when he speaks for or acts in accordance 
with the norms of the work (which is to say, the implied author’s norms), unreliable when he does 
not” (158). This conception of unreliable narration as an act of authorial communication has been 
stressed ever since Booth, even in more semiotic oriented studies (Chatman 1978 148; Chatman 
1990; Rimmon-Kenan).  
 In 2005 one of the strongest advocates of the concept of implied author, James Phelan, 
criticized Nünning for the total neglect of the significance of authorial agency. Phelan claimed that 
the interpretive move to read textual inconsistencies as a signal of unreliability wouldn’t make any 
hermeneutic sense if it wasn’t based on the assumption, that ‘someone’ designed the inconsistency 
as a signal of unreliability (48). Later (2011a), he made a strong point for distinguishing between 
unreliable narration from deficient narration, where the latter designates exactly the unintended off-
kilter narration, that can e.g. be found in factual narrative. 
                                                 
1 See my discussions in Hansen 2003, 2007. 
2 Goldschmidt’s The Vicar of Wakefield is an example as shown by Vera Nünning. One can find parallel studies of other 
cases by Dorrit Cohn and Bruno Zerweck.  
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What we have to consider, however, is to what extent the question of authorial control 
or intention is relevant when we are analysing and interpreting unreliable narrators. In what follows, 
I will approach this question by focussing on the textual and reader-cognitive dynamics involved in 
unreliable narration. In the first part of the article, I will be questioning the claimed essentiality of 
an authorial agent in the detection of narrator unreliability from three different angles: One 
concerning the border between diegetic and extradiegetic issues. Another with specific focus on 
unreliable simultaneous narration (first person, present tense). And a third with attention paid to the 
role of unreliable narrators in factual narratives. In the second part, I propose a model for describing 
the different dynamic roles the authorial agent as well as the empirical reader plays in different 
forms of unreliable narration.  
1. The (ir)relevance of the authorial agent in the detection of unreliable 
narration   1.1. Mixing diegetic and extra-diegetic issues 
We will first of all have to make a distinction between first and third person narration. It has been 
claimed that third person narration doesn’t allow for unreliable narration (Stanzel 152; Chatman 
1990 150), while others have argued that techniques like FID and other sorts of focalization most 
certainly promotes unreliable narration (Behrendt and Hansen). Insofar as third person narration 
implies presence (no matter how weak it might be) of an extra-diegetic narrating instance, one can 
argue that consideration of this ‘authorial narrator’ is necessary. 
If the perspective, however, is limited to first person narration (and this will be the 
case for the following), we might claim that it in principle is only in an extra-textual or extra-
diegetical respect that the authorial agent is of relevance – that is if we want to contextualize a work 
in (literary) history, in an authorship, etc. Unlike the character narrator, the author isn’t partaking in 
the diegesis, and when we are working on the detection of a narrator’s unreliability, we approach 
the problem as a diegetic issue. We do not at first hand make considerations about what the author 
wants to tell us by using an unreliable narrator. To exemplify: if we ask what it is that reveals to us 
that the narrator of Nabokov’s Lolita (1955) Humbert Humbert is unreliable, the answer is more 
likely to be that it is due to his misinterpretation of Dolores Haze’s signals as being sexual, rather 
than it is because of a deviation from the norms of the implied author referred to as Nabokov. As it 
is, Nabokov doesn’t exist in Humbert’s world, and when we discuss the world of Humbert, his 
motives and (mis)understandings, Nabokov has to be excluded. This might seem a rather 
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superfluous point to make since the argument could be challenged by pointing to the fact that it is 
Nabokov who sanctions the normativity of the world Humbert misinterprets. But one should be 
aware of blending diegetic and extradiegetic concerns. Having recourse to the author as an answer 
to complexities in the diegesis is an analytical and interpretational ‘deus ex machina’ – i.e. an easy 
way of solving textual problems by interference from outside the text. 
This problem becomes even more visible when we approach more ambiguous 
unreliability – i.e. texts where the detection of the narrator’s unreliability to some extend depends 
on the reader’s active partaking in the construction of meaning. Here the authorial agent plays a less 
active role as a controller of the semiotic process. If we, with reference to Booth’s study of irony 
(1974), bring in the distinction between stable and unstable irony as a way of classifying unreliable 
narration3, we can propose that one of the characteristics of ‘classical’ unreliable narration is that it 
is possible for the reader to infer a relatively consistent diegetic universe up against which the first-
person narrator’s unreliability is measured. The reader’s reconstruction of this universe is guided by 
different means such as the narrator’s misinterpretation of reported actions and sayings, other 
narrators’ corresponding reports, or a close resemblance between the fictional and the factual world 
letting the reader judge the sayings and doings of the narrator in accordance with his or her own 
norms and values. This stable type of unreliable narration is contrasted by an unstable type being a 
prominent feature of much modernist and postmodernist fiction which often diminishes (if not 
eliminates) the possibility for the reader to follow these reconstructive strategies, by giving us no 
correctional standpoint in the text (there is no privileged diegetic normativity), but leaving only a 
highly disturbed narration. Here, the reader often will seek shelter under psychological standard-
categories of schizophrenia, psychosis, paranoia, etc., and thereby naturalize the text by external 
means. 
The border between the stable and the unstable unreliability is not very clear though, 
and as mentioned above, the history of interpretation shows that texts which at one time has been 
considered straightforward reliable, in a new historical situation, due to changes in ideology and 
culture, turns out to be read as unreliable. The ‘mechanism’ triggering this radical change is to be 
found in the fact, that the normative system of the story world, once being in accordance with the 
consensual understanding of reality, now is being discredited. But since the reader’s ‘entry’ to this 
story world is by an intradiegetic narrator, who in the first place served the role as a trustworthy 
witness, the reader imposes the narrator the responsibility for the unacceptable norm of the work. 
                                                 
3 Also suggested by Greta Olson. 
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 1.2. Simultaneous narration and unreliability 
A special case of interest here is first person present tense narration or what Dorrit Cohn has 
labelled “simultaneous narration” (1999: 96-108).4 As Monika Fludernik points out, the use of 
present tense has an interesting consequence for the reader’s “(re-)conceptualization of the natural 
storytelling frame, where a story has to have happened in the past in order to become tellable” 
(1996 223). Simultaneous narration cannot be ascribed to our standard notion of a narrative since it 
does not establish the spatial and temporal distance to the incidents narrated we normally consider 
essential for a ‘natural’ narrational situation. Cohn quotes e.g. Rimmon-Kenan for claiming that 
“[c]ommon sense tells us that events may be narrated only after they happen” (96). This 
understanding has problems if it is transferred to simultaneous narration in the form it is seen in 
Robbe-Grillet’s La Jalousie (1957), Pirsig’s Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (1974), 
Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians (1982), Easton Ellis’ American Psycho (1990) and Dennis 
Cooper’s My Loose Thread (2002 – see excerpt below). One could claim that the widespread use of 
simultaneuos narration should be understood with reference to audio-visual media narration insofar 
that it also establishes a recording ‘here-and-now’ mode. Up through the 20th century the 
exploration of the possibility of adapting cinematographic narrational forms to written fiction has 
been common.5 But as Fludernik and Cohn notes, one cannot generalize this understanding, since 
also feelings and thoughts very well might be part of the telling as seen in the Cooper excerpt 
below. Neither can simultaneous narration be identified with what has been labelled ‘historical 
present’ since this concept, as Cohn rightly notes, designates an ‘as if’ form, where the narrating 
subject tries to recreate a situation from the past by describing it from the perspective of the 
incidents. In that sense historical present serves as a sort of covered preterite being disclosed by 
knowledge of future incidents or the like. Dorrit Cohn characterizes simultaneous narration as a 
“fictional present” (106) with reference to Käte Hamburgers “fictional past”, that is the epic 
preterite, where the deictic temporal adverbials are connected to the preterite and thereby establish 
fictive I-origos from which the deictic markers depart. Furthermore Cohn shows that fictional 
present not only differs from the historical present but also deviates from ‘interior monologue’, 
understood as “texts that present themselves as mental quotations from start to finish, as unmediated 
mimesis of consciousness” (103). Even though the latter notion can cover parts of the narration in 
simultaneous narrated texts, it does not fit all aspects. As Cohn points out the inner happenings can 
                                                 
4I have studied first person, present tense narration more thoroughly in Hansen 2006 and Hansen 2008. 
5 See e.g. Robbe-Grillet’s considerations in For a New Novel (1966). 
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very well be “mediated by a knowingly analytical voice”, and extended stretches of time become 
time and again compressed in summary sentences whereby the sense of an unrolling mental 
quotation is being undermined.  
Cohn draws attention to three central and interdependent characteristics for 
simultaneous narration: firstly, the incongruity of the narrative situation insofar as it cannot be 
naturalized by the reader’s attempt to postulate a verisimilar narrative situation (tape-recording, oral 
diary, etc.). Secondly, the semantic implications of the narrative tense, e. g. the fact that the 
narrator’s imaginations and observations are being juxtaposed and presented in the same temporal 
grammar which facilitates a high degree of uncertainty regarding what is true and false, real and 
fantasy, inside the fiction. Thirdly, “the absolute focalization of its narrated experience” which rests 
on analogy between action, thought and narration. To Cohn’s list we can add a fourth characteristic 
– namely that the simultaneous narration promotes a complete elimination of any visible signs of an 
authorial or narrational agent beyond the first person narrator. One could go as far as claiming that 
the author is reduced to a paratextual function that sanctions the work’s status as fiction and leaves 
the whole act of narration to the character-narrator. The narration belongs solely to the character 
and is therefore characterized by what Phelan (2005) has described as narrator functions (that is 
communication on the axis between the narrator and the narratee) and not disclosure functions 
(communication on the axis between author and authorial audience). In cases like these it might 
perhaps make better sense to talk about an omitted rather than an implied or implicit author.  
Simultaneous narration is in general most certainly promoting unreliability, especially 
because of what Cohn described above as the semantic implications of the narrative tense where the 
narrator’s imaginations and observations are juxtaposed and presented in the same temporal 
grammar. Here the determination of what ground a narrator’s unreliability stands on is more a 
matter of interpretation in the nietzschean creative sense than in the hermeneutic unveiling sense. 
Simultaneous narration will most often be full of contradictions and misunderstandings, but the 
questions of why the narrator is as s/he is does not find a satisfactory answer, but leaves the reader 
speculating and pending between an infinite number of cultural and psychological frames. 
 1.3 Unreliable narration and factual narrative 
The problem with subordinating the unreliable narrator an authorial control can also be approached 
by considering the status of the concept in relation to factual narratives. Even though Booth in his 
last essay on the implied author (2005) made an attempt to convince us that we are operating with 
 6 
implied author-like constructions in daily communication one cannot but regret that he lacked to 
confront the unreliability problem in the same stroke since the problems of maintaining the implied 
author-unreliable narrator relation shows its problems most clearly here. It has on several occasions 
been claimed that unreliable narrators are a distinct feature of fictional narrative. By Cohn, in her 
discussion of ‘discordant narration’, by claiming  
 
“that the diagnosis of “discordance” can apply only to a fictional narrative, not to the 
kind of story-telling (oral or written) that presumes to refer to real facts; though we 
often apply the term “unreliable” to voices we regard as wrong-headed in non-
fictional works (historical, journalistic, biographical, or autobiographical), the narrator 
of such works is the author, the author is the narrator, so that we cannot imply a 
significance that differs from the one they explicitly proclaim”(307).  
 
Fludernik (2001) argues that even though we can imagine a ‘real’ Jason Compson (as from 
Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury), our response will be very different. We will  
 
“believe the same thing about a real-world Jason Compson that we do about the 
fictional persona – he is a nasty character – but the peculiar effect of literary 
unreliability will not arise in real life. In real life we do not have the feeling that an 
author (implied or real) is communing with us behind a real-life Jason’s back, trying 
to teach us a lesson of detective ingenuity”(97).  
 
We should, however, not neglect the fact that ‘unreliable narrator’ is among the concepts with the 
clearest connection to our experiences with ‘real’ narrators. As noted by Greta Olson concepts like 
‘unreliable’, ‘untrustworthy’ and ‘fallible’ all come from our intercourse with human beings, not 
texts, and we are constantly surrounded by ‘real’ unreliable narrators. But to claim that their 
unreliability is based on a deviation from the morals, convictions, codes or conventions of an 
implied author imposes a God-like creature in our everyday surroundings that seems questionable. 
Our recognition of ‘real’ narrators’ unreliability is based on our decoding of their 
misunderstandings and our superior knowledge, and that no matter whether we are engaging with 
the narrator face to face or through written or audiovisual mediation in genres like news 
broadcasting, documentaries, etc. I have reflected upon this issue in more detail elsewhere (2005, 
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2007b), and will for now have to jump to conclusion and claim that even though there of course is a 
fundamental and important difference between fact and fiction, there is no difference in our 
detection of narrational unreliability, just as the effect is if not the same then at least comparable. 
Pekka Tammi has objected to this conception by claiming that the effect on us, the readers, is very 
different whether it is a factual or a fictive narrative we are encountering. In the latter case our 
response on an unreliable narrator will be of aesthetic pleasure, while it in the former will be of 
annoyance and scepticism. I agree with Professor Tammi, but will add that the aesthetic pleasure we 
are feeling in the case of the fictive text is including the annoyance and scepticism – on an aesthetic 
basis, so to say. 
When we are becoming aware of a narrator’s potential unreliability a change in our 
focus appears. We no longer only concern ourselves with the story being told, but also with the 
teller’s stake in the story, and even though the examination of a narrator’s reliability shall base its 
evidence on the text, we have to acknowledge that contextual facts and circumstances do play a 
role. Booth actually touches upon this issue indirectly in his analysis of Henry James’ “The Liar” in 
The Rhetoric of Fiction. He shows that the story’s “complex irony” best can “be seen by contrasting 
the two views of what takes place, Lyon’s and the reader’s” (347) by making a careful listing of 
how the reader’s view of the events differs from the narrator’s. What Booth shows here, but only 
barely reflects upon, is that the reader’s determination of a narrator’s unreliability to a large extent 
is based on a comparison of the narrator-character’s behavioural patterns with his or her own 
understanding of behaviour, and the same thing goes to a far extend for historical facts and 
culturally determined beliefs. Expressed in more general terms we can say that when the fictional 
story world of the text is comparable to and obeying the same (or at least some of the same) rules as 
the reader’s factual world, the reader relies on this frame of reference as being presupposed by the 
text. In this respect it is evident that unreliable narration cannot be considered without inclusion of 
the reader’s cognitive capacities and that explanations leaning too heavily up against the implied 
author as the primary frame of reference will be more reductive than the phenomenon deserves.  
Nonetheless, when examining fictional narratives we will have to do some 
consideration regarding the author’s status and function. Also Ansgar Nünning came to a similar 
conclusion when he in a later essay on unreliable narration gave full credit to Phelan’s redefinition 
of the implied author and at the same time explicitly rejects some of his former (and on several 
occasions repeated) conclusions. Nünning claims that his exclusive focus on the reader’s response 
for the determination of a narrator’s unreliability needs to be  
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“supplemented by the insight that the narrator’s unintentional self-incrimination in 
turn presupposes an intentional act by some sort of higher-level authorial agency, 
though it may be open to debate whether we should attribute the constructive and 
intentional acts to ‘the implied author’ or ‘the real author.’” (2005 100)  
 
Phelan, for his part, has also tried to close the discussion by suggesting that “focus on these issues 
[the location of the unreliability] in our respective laboratories of narrative theory has prevented us 
from paying sufficient attention to the diversity of unreliable narration existing in the wild” (2007 
225). Instead of maintaining the never ending discussion of what determines unreliability in the 
narration, Phelan wants us to start studying some unreliable narrators and develop the vocabulary 
by which we analyze and discuss them. 
One cannot but approve these attempts to if not unite, then at least approach two very 
diverse theoretical stands on the same issue. Nevertheless, if the hope was that the result should be a 
‘third way’, bringing together the best of the two theories, one would get disappointed. Nünning, for 
his part, promised to combine them for us, but what he offered at the end of the day in his analysis 
of Ian McEwan’s “Dead as They Come” was a detailed listing of different textual indicators for the 
character-narrator being unreliable, and a regularly mentioning of the implied author as being the 
one who have “furnished” the story with these textual signals or “equipped the narrator with 
idiosyncratic verbal habits” (2005 103), etc. The intriguing and provocative questions he himself 
made repeatedly on other occasions (and even earlier in the same essay), seemed more or less 
forgotten.  
In Nünning’s earlier mentioning of McEwan’s short story, the suggestion was that “a 
male chauvinist fetishist who gets his kicks out of making love to store mannequins is unlikely to 
detect any distance between his norms and those of the mad monologist in Ian McEwan’s “Dead as 
They Come”” (97). But unfortunately he did not show us how and why. Actually, one could easily 
doubt whether it would be the case. This is not said to discredit Nünning’s analysis in general. Quite 
contrary since his study is detailed and convincing in its uncovering of reading conventions, 
linguistic markers of unreliability in the character-narrator’s telling, etc., but it is obvious that his 
inclusion of the implied author is superfluous. The only function of the implied author in his 
interpretation is to be the source of the arrangement of the narrative, and his conception seems close 
to that of Flaubert, when he in the letter to Marie-Sophie Leroyer de Chantepie (18 March 1857) 
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claimed that the author should be: “as God is in creation, invisible and all-powerful; one must sense 
him everywhere but never see him.” What might be in question though, is whether we in general are 
‘sensing’ the author, when we are dealing with unreliable narrators, and if we do, what function this 
author has?  
2. The dynamics of unreliable narration 2.1 A communication model 
To approach this aspect, we can turn our attention towards what we might call ‘the reader-cognitive 
process’ involved in unreliable narration; that is how and on what basis we respond on signals or 
impressions of the narrator being unreliable. To this we need a basic communicational model: 
I will partly follow Phelan in his critique of the semiotic attempts to explain the implied author in 
terms of textual structures, but instead of the by Phelan suggested term ‘the implied author’, I take 
the full step by considering the continuity between implied and empirical author and label it ‘the 
author’.6 Here, we are close to Genette, when he discusses the same issue in Nouveau Discourse du 
rêcit and claims that there is only one author – and all we know about him we learn through the 
texts he has written. This author can, but will not necessarily, appear in the text as an observable 
communicative agent. In many cases – the epistolary novel, the first person confessional novel, in 
simultaneous narration as discussed above, and in many focalized novels – the authorial presence is 
limited to paratextual functions, while in other cases, the author plays a more explicit role – by 
                                                 
6 Here, I am in line with Nielsen (2010) whose argument goes in the same direction. 
         Phelan (2011b) has suggested a rhetorical model of communication as an alternative to the semiotic based model. 
Here, narrator and (e.g.) characters are ‘aligned’ as rhetorical tools for the author to bring forward his story or message. 
The model seems promising, but the value of the semiotic models explication of levels or embedment in the narration is 
not yet included in it. 
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showing omniscience, being ironic or authoritarian in making comments on the story, etc. In these 
cases, the boundary between the author and the narrator (being impersonal) is blurred.  
In the other end of the communicative axis, at the reader-position, the same claim of 
continuity we made on behalf of the author can be made between the implied reader and the 
empirical reader: The two subjects are not identical, but to be able to understand the text, the 
empirical reader has to lend him-/herself to the implied reader by disregarding personal issues, etc. 
In the same way, there is not always a clear cut between the reader and the narratee position. Often 
the narratee of the text is very explicitly the reader as in Poe’s “The Tell-Tale Heart” or Twain’s 
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn (1876). In other cases the narratee is the narrator him- or 
herself, and in yet other cases the narratee subject is less clear. In the former discussed simultaneous 
narration it is very hard to positively determine a narratee because of the lack of appeal to any 
receiving instance and the mixing of recording, recalling and reflecting modes. And here, the the 
boundary between the narratee and the reader is also blurred, if not the narratee dissolves in favor of 
its corresponding subject outside the diegesis: the reader. 
The detection of the narration as unreliable can be based on several issues – and 
several suggestions have been made to account for these. Kathleen Wall has brought attention to 
what she named ‘verbal tics’, that is small interjections and comments which hint an uncertainty in 
the narrators relating of the events. Gaby Allrath has done systematic studies of the textual signals 
evoking narrational unreliability, counting explicit claims of own reliability, subjective efforts of 
partiality, absurdities or violations of the logic and the premises the story world rests on, changes in 
the use of pronouns, marked attention towards own reactions, etc.7. Another way of getting around 
this is through pragmatics and Grice’s conversational maxims as done by Theresa Heyd, since the 
reader’s determination of the narration as unreliable to a large extend depends on the narrator’s 
exaggerated violation of the maxims. 
 2.2 Unreliable first person narration  
As already mentioned the distinction between stable and unstable irony can function very well as a 
general framework for the function of the narration: 
 
                                                 
7 See also Busch. 
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We can from this point specify the function of the narratee in unreliable narration more precisely 
and first use an example with an explicitly marked narratee, namely Poe’s “The Tell-Tale Heart” 
(1843): 
 
“TRUE! --nervous --very, very dreadfully nervous I had been and am; but why will 
you say that I am mad? The disease had sharpened my senses --not destroyed --not 
dulled them. Above all was the sense of hearing acute. I heard all things in the heaven 
and in the earth. I heard many things in hell. How, then, am I mad? Hearken! and 
observe how healthily --how calmly I can tell you the whole story. 5 
… 
And have I not told you that what you mistake for madness is but over-acuteness of 
the sense? 
… 
   No doubt I now grew very pale; --but I talked more fluently, and with a heightened 10 
voice. Yet the sound increased --and what could I do? It was a low, dull, quick sound -
-much such a sound as a watch makes when enveloped in cotton. I gasped for breath --
and yet the officers heard it not. I talked more quickly --more vehemently; but the 
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noise steadily increased. I arose and argued about trifles, in a high key and with 
violent gesticulations; but the noise steadily increased. Why would they not be gone? I 15 
paced the floor to and fro with heavy strides, as if excited to fury by the observations 
of the men --but the noise steadily increased. Oh God! what could I do? I foamed --I 
raved --I swore! I swung the chair upon which I had been sitting, and grated it upon 
the boards, but the noise arose over all and continually increased. It grew louder --
louder --louder! And still the men chatted pleasantly, and smiled. Was it possible they 20 
heard not? Almighty God! --no, no! They heard! --they suspected! --they knew! --they 
were making a mockery of my horror!-this I thought, and this I think. But anything 
was better than this agony! Anything was more tolerable than this derision! I could 
bear those hypocritical smiles no longer! I felt that I must scream or die! and now --
again! --hark! louder! louder! louder! louder!  25 
   “Villains!” I shrieked, “dissemble no more! I admit the deed! --tear up the planks! 
here, here! --It is the beating of his hideous heart!””
 
The narrator of “The Tell-Tale Heart” fails to tell his story calmly even though he claims that he can 
without any problem. The communicative situation is very explicit in the first 14 lines of the 
quotation, where the narratee is addressed directly, but the more engaged the narrator becomes with 
the story he is telling, the more out of sight the narratee seems. The skeptical narratee he started out 
addressing is no longer present to him; nor is the attempt to prevent the label of madness. Instead he 
tells to no one directly, except perhaps himself as signaled in the “-this I thought, and this I think” 
in line 22.8  
 This split function of the narratee is crucial:  In the beginning of the story the narration 
is directed towards a potentially rejecting receiver; in the final half it has no direction: the narratee’s 
understanding is taken for granted. This distance can be located in the first sentence as the distance 
between the opening’s acknowledgement of being nervous – “TRUE! --nervous --very, very 
dreadfully nervous I had been and am” – and the question “but why will you say that I am mad?”, a 
distance between a knowing and intimate narratee on the one hand and a skeptical, rejecting narrate 
on the other. In that sense the relation between the narrator and the narratee takes the form of a 
process: The narrator appeals to the understanding of the narratee but is at the same time aware of 
                                                 
8 Nielsen (2011) reads the same passages of “The Tell-Tale Heart” in a parallel way by approaching the distances 
between the narrating I and the narrated I as a conflation of voices. 
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the narratee being skeptical, and it is exactly this expected skepticism that causes the dynamic of the 
narration and further builds up the character of a madman. 
 We can generalize this duplicity of the narratee by calling it the narratee’s double 
function of ‘approval’ and ‘rejection’, and suggest that our understanding of the narration as 
unreliable partly is caused by the narrator’s attempt to resist the rejective side of the narratee since 
this is the source of self corrections, self interruptions, verbal tics, etc. 
  
This direct communicational act also comes to serve as a framework by which the reader 
understands the incidents narrated as questionable. When the narrator in the final part of the story 
hears things that the other present characters doesn’t hear, we do not have any faith in his claim of 
acuteness of senses. Especially not since he fails to keep himself distant to the incidents being told. 
The narration expresses sensational involvement in the incidents but looses at the same time the 
narratee of sight, locking the narrator in his obsessive madness as expressed in the “-this I thought, 
and this I think”. 
 The double function of the narratee is in that respect repeated at the reader-position of 
the scheme. Reading unreliable narrated stories sets the reader in a double role of at the one hand 
lending him- or herself to a literal reading of the narrated, and on the other hand a correcting 
reading disclosing what ‘really’ happened. We can therefore, slightly metaphorically, call the 
former a ‘misreading function’ and the latter the ‘proof-reading function’. 
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The emphasis of these functions will of course vary from text to text – and from reading to reading, 
which is a complexity we will leave out for know. “The Tell Tale Heart” is quite unproblematic: the 
reader’s proof-reading function is privileged due to the explicitness of the narrator’s unreliability 
and the narratee’s rejective function. The misreading is therefore only hypothetical, and considered 
with regard to our irony classification Poe’s text is to be categorized as stable. Therefore the reading 
strategy followed by the reader can be labeled as reconstructive insofar as s/he has no problems 
recounting for the diegesis’ ‘real’ order and to what extend the narrator is misrepresenting it 
through his telling. In that sense the more marked the narratee’s rejection of the narrated is, the 
more emphatic is the proof-reading function of the reader. On the other hand, in cases where the 
narrator doesn’t counter the narratee’s potential rejection, the reader’s misreading function is 
emphasized. The reader will not in the same way be given directions to reconstruct the diegesis 
beyond the narrator’s telling, but will instead have to take recourse to a constructive strategy to 
dissolve internal contradictions and inconsistencies in the narration by referring to text-external 
frames of reference such as psychology, socio-cultural frames, consensual understandings of 
behavior, historical knowledge, generic considerations, etc. 
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“The Tell-Tale Heart” can serve as an example here again, if we expand our scope of our 
interpretation of the narrator’s unreliability from the reconstruction of the misrepresented part of the 
fabula to the implicit parts and ask the obvious question of why the narrator acts as he does – is he a 
case of schizophrenia and paranoia? Is there an oedipal conflict present in his killing of the old 
man? These questions cannot be satisfactorily answered on behalf of the text alone, and we could 
go as far as claiming that it is one of its great aesthetic values that it doesn’t give unambiguous 
answers. Therefore the reader will seek out in a larger frame of reference to find help to naturalize 
the textual inconsistencies. 
 2.3 Unreliable simultaneous narration 
This act of constructive interpretation is perhaps most visible in unreliable simultaneous narration 
narration as discussed earlier. With reference to Cohn’s study, I brought attention to the semantic 
implications of this narrative tense where the narrator’s imaginations and observations are being 
juxtaposed and presented in the same temporal grammar, and whereby it is very uncertain what is 
true and false, real and fantasy. In these cases the narration takes on a very unstable ironical mode, 
leaving the reader in a position beyond the determination of true and false, since all that can be said 
for truth is that the narrator’s relating of the events is false. In cases like these the narratee is, as 
mentioned, indeterminable – the narrator tells to no one specific and the rejective and the approving 
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function becomes closer connected to the narrator himself. We can observe this in the following 
excerpt from Dennis Cooper’s My Loose Thread (2002): 
 
“I’m at breakfast. It’s always something easy to make like a cold cereal. Dad watches 
taped golf from the weekend, and my mom reads the paper. Something in her is going 
off about me. I can see it’s not the world. Jim’s food is already a ruin, which is the 
only thing wrong. 
 ‘Jim rode his bike,’ she says. Not hello, or anything. That’s news, since I 5 
always drive him to school. 
 ‘Yeah?’ 
She turns a page fast, and it rips. But I’m tired enough from one or maybe two hour’s 
sleep, that her shit doesn’t reach me. 
 ‘Say it, mom.’ 10 
 ‘Your dad had a cramp, and I was up, and I saw you,’ she says. 
 ‘Meaning what?’ I’m pretty sure I was naked, and holding my clothes 
and my shoes in a wad. 
 ‘I called Dr. Thorne,’ she says. 
 ‘What did Jim say?’ 15 
 ‘He protected you,’ she says. 
 ‘From what?’ I throw my cereal bowl at the wall.” 
… 
I think Rand is still on the floor of my bedroom. I mean in some way. I know he didn’t 
die there. He got up after a couple of minutes, and left. But I think he’d come there if 20 
he could go anywhere. That’s the Franks’ big idea, or their excuse. The dead don’t 
want to be dead, and they only give a shit about life. When I got back to my bedroom 
last night, I thought a lot about Rand, then decided. I killed the boy because I can’t kill 
myself. That’s why I hit him so hard. I realize he isn’t Jim. When I get that upset, it 
doesn’t take much to remind me.” (23)  25 
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Observe how the teller describes his own throwing of the cereal bowl in line 17 without any emotion 
expressed in the telling – a distance we might consider a mark of another narratorial agent ‘beyond’ the 
I of the character-narrator, but which should rather be understood as a character trait of the disturbed 
young man telling and acting. This recording, laconic, mode of telling is changed in line 19 into a 
reflecting and doubting mode expressed through all the precautions – I think, I guess, I mean, maybe, I 
can’t tell, etc. – prompting the reader’s proofreading function, but leaving him or her with an explicit 
awareness of misreading because of the indeterminacy of the story world’s ‘real’ order. Here a 
naturalization will have to involve a constructive strategy. This is also part of the reason why it doesn’t 
make much sense to claim an authorial agent controlling the discourse in a case like this. Since the text 
doesn’t establish any privileged normativity or unambiguous, reconstructable story world, the 
determination of an (implied) author, understood as a “core of norms and choices” (Booth) or someone 
“responsible for the choices that creates the narrative text […] and that imbues the text with his or her 
values” (Phelan 2005 216) seems rather mistaken. The author’s presence is, so to say, taking the form 
of absence. We can therefore call ‘him’ the omitted author – a bare frame sanctioning the narrative as 
fiction and promoting a more scriptible than lisible text, to use the terminology of Roland Barthes, and 
thereby also hinting that in the far corner of this direction we find the works of Samuel Beckett and 
Alain Robbe-Grillet among others. In contrast, unreliable narration moving in the direction of stable 
irony might promote a sense of authorial control using the unreliable narrator as a means of stating a 
point through indirection, but still maintaining a stabilized and consistent story world which the 
narrator misinterprets – perhaps by including secondary narrators or by making caricature of the 
character-narrator. 
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This is partly the case in the Poe example, but not as manifestly as in e.g. Mark Twain’s Huckleberry 
Finn, where – as Booth rightly noticed – “the narrator claims to be naturally wicked while the author 
silently praises his virtues behind his back” (1991 159). But it shall be emphasized that in both the case 
of the omitted and the implicit author, the authorial agent does not play a secondary (if any) role in the 
reader’s detection of the narrator’s unreliability. This negotiation takes place between the narrator, the 
narratee and the reader. 
 
3. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study has been twofold: 
First of all I have wished to question the basic conception of unreliable narration as being 
exclusively conceptualized understood in relation to the concept of the implied author. My claim has 
been that this understanding is misguiding and that the claimed limitation of the unreliable narrator to 
fiction is caused exactly by this misunderstanding. When e.g. ‘born-again’ rhetorician Ansgar Nünning 
proposed that “the use of the unreliable narrator in genres other than narrative fiction – for instance 
dramatic genres like the memory play or in the dramatic monologue – as well as in other media and 
domains (incl. law and politics) deserves more attention than it hitherto has been given” (2005 105), it 
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seems hard to combine this future task with his consent to the idea that ”the narrator’s unintentional 
self-incrimination […] presupposes an intentional act by some sort of higher-level authorial agency”. 
How are we to locate a higher-level authorial agency in the narratives of law and politics? And instead 
of trying to locate/construct implied authors in this kind of texts, shouldn’t we rather be questioning our 
conception? 
The second aim has been to raise a discussion of the concept of the implied author. The 
rhetorical study of literature as it has been developed of the successors of Booth has given us 
indispensable tools for studying fiction and ethics, but the immense dependence on the implied author 
as the key concept for the theory causes more complications than it solves. To the rhetoricians the 
implied author is the cause for all dispositions in the narrative, whether they are of structural, 
semantical or ethical concern, and they do not hesitate to formulate these dispositions as intentions, that 
is: the implied author’s conscious choices. There is something paradoxical about attributing all 
meaning establishing features of the text to one, consciously controlling subjectivity in an age where 
semiotics, reader-response criticism and cognitive sciences have done considerable efforts to show that 
the reader has a major effect on what textual constructs means. Furthermore, the high focus on 
authorial intention shades the fact that entering a certain language game or a certain discourse – in this 
case the discourse of narrative – predetermines the possible meanings and developments of the told and 
functions ‘beyond’ the control of the speaker/author, so to say.9 We can still choose to describe such 
aspects in terms of intention, but we will have to understand it in a more abstract manner as a matter of 
‘directedness’ inherent in language and discourse. Authorial intention is in this sense only one intention 
between others and in many cases perhaps not the most significant one. 
My critique of the rhetoricians conception of the implied author are therefore not to be 
understood as yet an barthesian attempt to kill the author, but a plea for us to consider the almightiness 
‘he’ seems to have gained in recent literary theory. There are pragmatic reasons to postulate a strong, 
homogenizing authorial subjectivity behind the text: It functions as a unifying concept that brings 
together disparate aspects of textuality; it is normative authority sanctioning the norms and values of 
the story world (in ‘real life’ aka. ‘God’); it is an excellent tool for organizing and understanding 
History’s Grand Archive of literary texts; and in the implied-version (being separated from the flesh-
and-blood author) it is a mechanism in our continuous development of democracy, protecting what 
                                                 
9 Jonathan Culler’s analysis of the double logic of narrative is to me still one of the best demonstrations of this. 
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Derrida once labeled ‘this strange institution called literature’ – that is an institution for the freedom of 
speech. But all these aspects of the authorial agent are of extratextual interest and not really a concern 
we are engaging in the reading process or in the interpretative act. Here the author is, at best, a 
communicative agent – if not absent, since just as well as it is common sense that written fiction need 
an author, it is also common sense that the author often explicitly withdraws from the work when it 
comes to the determination of what it means.  
Nonetheless there is one major reason for us to maintain the idea of the author as the 
authority determining what a text means. If not for anything else, the believe in authorial control of the 
text is a strong working hypothesis. In an interview with Stefano Rosso Paul de Man was asked about 
the difference between his own way of reading and that of Jacques Derrida and he answered the 
following: 
 
“I have a tendency to put upon texts an inherent authority, which is stronger, I think, than 
Derrida is willing to put on them. I assume, as a working hypothesis (as a working 
hypothesis, because I know better than that), that the text knows in an absolute way what 
it’s doing. I know this is not the case, but it is a necessary working hypothesis that 
Rousseau knows at any time what he is doing and as such there is no need to deconstruct 
Rousseau. In a complicated way, I would hold to that statement that  ”the text 
deconstructs itself, is self-deconstructive” rather than being deconstructed by a 
philosophical intervention from the outside of the text. The difference is that Derrida’s 
text is so brilliant, so incisive, so strong that whatever happens in Derrida, it happens 
between him and his own text. He doesn’t need Rousseau, he doesn’t need anybody else; 
I do need them very badly because I never had an idea of my own, it was always through 
a text, through the critical examination of a text … I am a philologist and not a 
philosopher …” (791) 
 
To all those of us who consider ourselves more philologists than philosophers, the author is an 
important concept in creating understanding of a text. If we can agree on this, the main difference 
between the here presented conception and that of the rhetoricians is perhaps not as big as we thought 
and will be best explained as a difference of perspective. To rhetoricians literature is considered an act 
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of creation, while the conception here presented is based on semiotics and more oriented towards the 
act of reception. Valuable concepts like e.g. Phelan’s distinction of ‘disclosure functions’ and ‘narrator 
functions’ suits both conceptions, even though they might be followed by a long and tiresome 
metaanalytical discussion of whether they are describing “functions available to the implied author” 
(2005 214) or textual marks causing the reader to construct an idea of an authorial presence behind the 
text.  
But if we can agree that the believe in the author’s all-embracing control of the text and 
its meaning is only a working hypothesis, we are also obliged to work out ways of describing what 
actually is happening in the process of reading and making meaning. And the author’s authority might 
very well have to be more delimited here.  
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